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In late December 1941, with Washington still reeling from the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour a few weeks earlier, Canada's 
new under-secretary of state for External Affairs, Norman Robertson, 
sat down to ponder the future of Canadian-American relations. His 
reflections, perhaps influenced by the gothic architecture of his East 
Bloc offices, were gloomy. In a stroke, he acknowledged, the Japanese 
attack and Washington's entry into the war against Berlin and Tokyo 
had altered forever the somewhat imprecise but comfortable ground 
-somewhere between Britain and the US- that Canada had occupied 
before the war.2 The US was now a world power, an imperial power, 
and what that meant for Canada was not immediately clear. 
Indeed, it is still not clear even today. The effort to work out a sat-
isfying basis for relations with an imperial US has proved to be an 
exceptionally difficult task for several generations of Canadians and 
1 Historical Section-Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 
The views expressed in this paper are the authors and should not be interpreted as 
reflecting the policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or 
the Government of Canada. 
2 N.A. Robertson, "Memorandum from the Under-Secretary of State for External 
Affairs to the Secretary of State for External Affairs", 22 December 1941. 
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their leaders. Drawn by the historic lure of American wealth and a 
broad set of shared values but pushed apart by an inescapable if indis-
tinct sense of their own uniqueness, Canadians and their governments 
have pursued a startling variety of policies towards the US since 1945. 
In the aftermath of Second World War, with the Cold War hovering on 
the horizon and the Great Depression of the 1930s still fresh in their 
minds, Canadians embraced a close economic and political partner-
ship with the US. Over time, however, they sought to loosen these 
ties, politically in the 1960s, and then economically in the 1970s. 
Perhaps inevitably, as these experiments eventually lost some of their 
appeal, bilateral rapprochement followed in the 1980s. From a dis-
tance, Washington watched these peregrinations, sometimes with ir-
ritation, often with bemusement, but almost always tolerantly, allow-
ing Canada to set the relationship's pace and tone. 
Canada only emerged as an important US ally in its own right in the 
years just after the Second World War. While Western Europe and Asia 
struggled to recover from the war, Washington came to count on Cana-
da as a close and reliable North Atlantic partner. When the nascent 
United Nations proved ineffectual in the face of Soviet aggression, Cana-
da helped the US create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
At the peak of the Canadian military effort in 1953-54, Canada spent 
8.8 percent of its Gross National Product (GNP) on defence, the fourth 
largest defence budget in NATO.3 Canada was there when it mattered. In 
1950, Canadian troops challenged communist aggression in Korea; in 
1954, Canadian diplomats took on the Western burden to help France 
escape from Indochina; and in 1956, it was a Canadian, the secretary 
of state for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, who helped prevent the 
Western alliance from tearing itself apart during the Suez Crisis. Cer-
1 Figures cited in David Bercuson, "Canada, NATO, and rearmament, 1950-1954: 
why Canada made a difference (but not for very long)". 
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tainly, Ottawa and Washington sometimes differed -OVER NATO, over 
Asia, and over continental defence- but these differences were mostly 
tactical and easily reconciled. 
During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the wartime changes in the 
economic relationship between the US and Canada were cemented 
into place. Britain was exhausted, and the prewar "North Atlantic tri-
angle", within which Canada balanced its imports from the US with 
its exports to Britain, was gone forever. 4 In the future, American im-
ports would have to be paid for with dollars earned by exports to the 
US and imports of American capital. Investors in the US, which 
emerged from the war with the world's strongest economy, were happy 
to oblige, delighted at the prospect of investing in their safe, familiar 
and profitable neighbour. 
Unimpeded, American capital flowed northward, the economy 
boomed, and Canadians cheered. The GNP grew steadily from $15 
billion in 1945 to over $21 billion in 1955.5 By the mid-1950s, Amer-
ican investment in Canada totalled $10.2 billion, up from approxi-
mately $5 billion in 1945.6 Cross-border trade grew as well. In 1945, 
Canada sent 38.7 per cent of its exports, worth $878 million, to the 
US. By the mid-1950s, this trade had increased to $2.54 billion, and 
represented almost 60 percent of Canada's exports.7 The buoyant 
economy fed the sense of national self-confidence that had developed 
during the war. United under the tranquil if uninspired leadership of 
Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, Canadians lapped up American 
magazines and movies and books, without questioning who or what 
4 Hector Mackenzie, "The ABC's of Canada's International Economic Relations, 
1945-51". 
5 Irving Brecher and Simon S. Reisman, Canada-United States Economic Relations, 
1957, p. 333. 
6 Ibidem, p. 88. 
7 F.H. Lacey (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada, 1983, p. G415-428. 
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they were. As one of the country's leading syndicated columnists 
pointed out, the answer was evident: "Tomorrow's Giant".8 
Still, in many quarters there was a vague but disturbing sense that 
too cosy a relationship with the US was somehow not good for Cana-
da. In 1951, Vincent Massey's Royal Commission on National Devel-
opment in the Arts, Letters and Sciences dismissed American movies, 
advertising and television as "alien".9 The anti-communist witch-hunts 
of Senator Joseph McCarthy upset Canadians, who were outraged 
when one of their diplomats, Herbert Norman, leaped to his death in 
1957 in the wake of allegations that he was a communist. Many Ca-
nadians, especially the roughly 45 percent who were British in origin, 
waxed nostalgic for the receding imperial connection, and they re-
coiled at St. Laurent's refusal to support Britain during the Suez Cri-
sis.10 John G. Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative leader, touched 
this anti-American nerve in the June 1957 federal election and drove 
the Liberals from power after 22 years in office. 
During his first three years as prime minister, Diefenbaker pursued a 
policy towards the US that hardly differed from the one followed by his 
Liberal predecessors. His anti-Americanism remained more apparent 
than real, a question of style rather than substance. The deep admiration 
he felt for President Dwight Eisenhower, who had served as supreme 
allied commander in Europe during the Second World War (and who 
carefully cultivated the prime minister's friendship), tempered his hos-
tility.11 The Conservative leader's only attempt to reverse the postwar 
8 Bruce Hutchison, Canada: Tomorrow's Giant, 1957. 
9 Cited in Joseph Levitt, A Vision Beyond Reach, 1982, p. 152. 
10 Figures derived from F.H. Lacey (ed.), Historical Statistics of Canada, p. A 110-
153. According to the 1951 census, 48 percent of the population was British 
(English, Irish or Scottish) in origin. This figure declined to 43 percent by the 1961 
census. 
11 H. Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker's World: A Populist in World Affairs, 1989, p. 17. 
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pattern of economic relations was a whimsical promise to divert 15 
percent of Canada's trade from the US to Britain. Uttered spontane-
ously in the emotional aftermath of Diefenbaker's first Commonwealth 
prime ministers' meeting, it was a pledge that he disavowed when he 
learned how disastrous it would be for the Canadian economy.12 
Under Diefenbaker, several pieces of important, unfinished defence 
business with the US were quickly settled. In 1957 he signed the agree-
ment establishing the joint North American Air Defence Command 
(NORAD), which replaced the ad hoc bilateral measures for continental 
defence then in effect with a formal, integrated system for defending the 
continent. Later that year, he agreed that Canadian forces with NATO 
and NORAD would accept tactical nuclear weapons from the US.13 The 
negotiations to determine the conditions under which Canadian troops 
would receive American nuclear weapons initially went well. 
Relations between Ottawa and Washington began to deteriorate in 
1961. Howard Green, Diefenbaker's secretary of state for External Af-
fairs, was an ardent champion of nuclear disarmament, and pressed 
the prime minister to repudiate his commitment. Caught between his 
secretary of State and his minister of Defence, who urged him to co-
operate fully with Washington, Diefenbaker played for time. 14 
John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower's successor, had little time to spare. 
Determined to increase the Western capacity to confront the Soviet 
Union, he didn't understand or sympathize with Diefenbaker's pre-
dicament.15 Personal animosity exacerbated their differences over 
12 J.L. Granatstein, Canada, 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation, 
1986, pp. 44-45. 
13 John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada's Department of External Affairs, Volume 
II: Coming of Age, 1946-1968, 1995, pp. 237-239. 
14 Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership, 
1992, pp. 77-78. 
15 Thomas Patterson, "Kennedy Quest for Victory and Global Crisis", 1989. 
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nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker resented the American's popularity 
and felt slighted when Kennedy gossiped at length with Pearson, then 
opposition leader, during a 1961 visit to Ottawa. Kennedy found the 
prime minister boring; later, when Diefenbaker refused to return a 
note from the president's briefing book, the president dismissed him 
as contemptible. Relations reached their nadir during the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis in October 1962. Diefenbaker's hesitant response to Wash-
ington's request for help was, from the American point of view, whol-
ly inadequate. Canadians thought so too, and Diefenbaker was sent 
packing in the spring of 1963. 
At its deepest level, however, the confrontation between Kennedy 
and Diefenbaker reflected growing differences between Canada and 
the us in their strategic outlook. As Europe settled into an uneasy but 
stable peace, Canadian policy-makers were anxious to pursue detente 
with the Soviet Union and normalize relations with Communist China. 
Western Europe's economic and political recovery sparked a restive-
ness in NATO and raised questions about Canada's place in the alliance. 
At the same time, the postwar economic order started to crumble. 
Canada's resource boom, fuelled by the Korean War, NATO rearmament, 
and European reconstruction, ended in 1956 and revealed disturbing 
structural weaknesses in the Canadian economy.16 Moreover, the cre-
ation of the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1958 signalled a 
movement toward greater economic regionalism and threatened the 
multilateral liberal trading system to which both the US and Canada 
remained committed. 
And so, in the early 1960s as the postwar order began to change, 
Canada and the US began a long period of experimentation as succes-
sive Canadian governments sought to find a spot in the American orbit 
16 A.F.W. Plumptre, Three Decades of Decision: Canada and the World Monetary 
System, 1944-75, 1977, pp. 155-158. 
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where Canadians could be comfortable -a process driven largely by 
Ottawa but often implicitly supported (or at least tolerated) by Wash-
ington. This was not immediately clear, perhaps, when Pearson, fol-
lowing his election as prime minister in May 1963, headed down to 
the Kennedy family retreat in Hyannisport, where the two leaders hap-
pily mended bilateral fences and chuckled over Diefenbaker's eccen-
tricities.17 But Kennedy's July 1963 decision to limit foreign access to 
US dollars sparked a currency crisis in Canada, revealed the underly-
ing weaknesses in a Canadian economy that consistently bought more 
than it sold, and drove home the need for change. Though Ottawa 
secured an exemption from Kennedy's measures, the lesson was clear: 
Canada would have to develop its secondary industry or remain unac-
ceptably dependent on uncertain imports of us capital. 18 
Initially, Pearson's nationalist minister of Finance, Walter Gordon, 
tried to do this alone, through a complicated scheme of production 
incentives that shifted about $260 million worth of automotive pro-
duction from the us to Canada. Washington was outraged -not so 
much by the objective, which it acknowledged as an equitable divi-
sion of the North American automotive market- but by Canada's uni-
lateralism. With considerable restraint, the Americans pushed and 
prodded for several months until they finally convinced Ottawa to 
seek a negotiated, bilateral solution, in keeping with the special na-
ture of the North American relationship. The result was the Auto Pact, 
a sectoral free trade agreement covering automotive products that 
promised increased economic integration in exchange for greater ac-
cess by Canadian industry to the larger, more lucrative American mar-
77 Greg Donaghy, Tolerant Allies: Canada and the United States, 1963- 1968, 2002, 
pp. 15-22. 
18 Greg Donaghy, "A continental philosophy: Canada, the United States, and the 
negotiations of the autopact, 1963-65". 
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ket. Combined with the bilateral agreements concluded in 1967 as 
part of the GATT'S Kennedy Round (where Pearson's government again 
traded increased economic integration for better access to the us mar-
ket) the impact on bilateral trade was striking, rising steadily from $15 
billion in 1963 to $20.5 billion in 1969 to 26.2 billion in 1972.19 
Goods shipped to the US rose as a share of total Canadian exports to 
almost 70 percent in 1968.20 And for the first time since 1911, free 
trade entered the political debate in Canada as a defensible policy 
option. 
While Pearson sought economic strength through closer trade rela-
tions with the US, he simultaneously tried to distance Ottawa from 
American military and foreign policy. Ottawa embraced recent chang-
es in the global configuration of power -the reconstruction of Europe, 
the declining likelihood of East-West confrontation, and the arrival of 
the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia- as an opportu-
nity for Canada to seek out a new and distinctive international role. 
Henceforth, governments in Ottawa would place a new emphasis on 
peacekeeping rather than on the kind of traditional military role as-
sociated with NATO and NORAD. When Canada sent troops to maintain 
the peace in Cyprus in March 1964, Pearson exclaimed with evident 
delight that "this was the kind of thing I like to see Canada doing."21 
This is not to say that Canada abandoned its role in NATO or NORAD 
during the 1960s; only that Canada's commitment to American lead-
ership was not as fulsome as it once was. In NATO, foreign minister 
Paul Martin emerged as a strong supporter of French efforts to pro-
mote detente with the Soviet Union despite US objections. In NORAD, 
19 F.H. Lacey, op. cit. pp. G401-407. 
20 Ibidem, pp. G415-428. The US absorbed almost 69 percent of Canadian exports 
in 1972, before settling in around 65 percent for the rest of the decade. 
21 Cited in Donaghy, Tolerant Allies, p. 99. 
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Canadian representatives resisted Pentagon demands to increase its 
military presence in Canada. Washington sometimes resented Otta-
wa's new attitude, but as long as Canada was ready to maintain its 
military commitment to Europe and participate however minimally in 
the defence of North America (and Ottawa was), then the us was pre-
pared to be tolerant. Canadian foreign and defence policy, the State 
Department well knew, reflected deep-rooted domestic imperatives 
that the us was powerless to change. In any event, as one American 
official observed cheerfully in 1965, "Canadian hearts are still in the 
right place."22 
And so they were, most of the time. Vietnam was the exception, 
and as the decade wore on, Canadians became increasingly distressed 
with the growing American preoccupation with this nasty war in South-
east Asia. Pearson's government generally supported US objectives in 
Vietnam but growing domestic opposition to the war among young, 
liberal intellectuals forced both Pearson and Martin to intervene with 
predictable results. When Pearson suggested that the Americans sus-
pend their bombing of North Vietnam, President Johnson exploded. 
"You don't piss on your neighbour's rug", he thundered at the shocked 
Canadian.23 Others, however, were more forgiving. After all, as Robert 
McClintock, a veteran State Department diplomat noted in May 1966, 
Pearson "despite his harsh criticism ... is still one of the best friends 
the us has". 24 
But Pearson's days were already numbered and he was gone by 
April 1968, leaving behind a country beginning to seethe with nation-
alist ferment. Vietnam, urban riots, and the assassinations of Robert 
22 John Leddy (through S/S) to Ambassador L. Thompson [September 1965]. RG 59, 
Box 1979, File Pol 1 Can, United States National Archives. 
23 Cited in Hillmer and Granatstien, For Better or For Worse, p. 224. 
24 Cited in Greg Donaghy, "Minding the Minister: Pearson, Martin and American 
Policy in Asia, 1963-68". 
540 Greg Donaghy 
Kennedy and Martin Luther King confirmed smug Canadian suspi-
cions about the innate violence of American society and their own 
superior moral rectitude. Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam, 
the importation of American capital and popular culture (Pearson had 
fought an inconclusive battle against Time and Reader's Digest) took 
on a sinister colouration. Inspired by the social and political theorists 
of Latin America, as well as an army of professors educated in Ameri-
can graduate schools, a growing number of Canadians delighted in 
depicting Canada-US relations in the harshest of neo-colonial terms. 
Political scientist Gad Horowitz even described the relationship as 
"analogous to the relationship of Finland to the Soviet Union".25 
If the "new nationalists" looked for change from Canada's new 
prime minister, the youthful and charismatic Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 
they were soon disappointed. Preoccupied with domestic concerns, 
Trudeau had a fairly shrewd appreciation for how little Canada mat-
tered compared with the surging powers of Japan, Europe, and China. 
He unleashed a searching review of Canadian foreign policy that es-
chewed the postwar activism of St. Laurent and Pearson -"no more 
helpful fixer"- and emphasized Canadian unity and Canadian eco-
nomic prosperity. Though relations between Nixon and Trudeau were 
never close -the US president notoriously described the Canadian as 
an "asshole"- Trudeau welcomed the efforts of the president and his 
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to advance detente and left 
Washington alone to get on with the job of running the world.26 
Trudeau's most significant changes in Canadian foreign policy-recog-
nizing Communist China and halving Canada's already negligible 
military contribution to NATO- were far from spectacular. Both were 
25 Cited in J.L. Granatstein, Yankee Co Home?: Canadians and Anti-Americanism, 
1996, p. 179. 
26 Robert Bothwell, op. cit., pp. 112-113. 
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accepted with barely a murmur of protest in Washington, where the 
White House was contemplating similar moves itself. On Vietnam, 
Trudeau wisely said as little as possible. 
Trudeau's much-vaunted foreign policy review ignored Canada's re-
lations with its southern neighbour, which were said to be too complex 
and all-encompassing to study in this fashion. That changed in August 
1971. With the US economy badly depleted by the war in Vietnam, 
Nixon imposed a series a measures to protect American balance of pay-
ments, including a 10 percent surcharge on imports. "We have too long 
acted as Uncle Sugar", Nixon told his staff, "and now we've got to be 
Uncle Sam". 27 As in 1963, Canadian ministers and officials rushed to 
Washington, cited the special relationship, and pleaded for an exemp-
tion. None was forthcoming. The special relationship, Nixon told the 
Canadian Parliament the following spring, was over. 
And so, perhaps, it was. Soon after Nixon's visit, the secretary of state 
for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, published the government's own re-
view of bilateral relations. Canada, it argued, had three options. It could 
maintain the status quo, it could seek a closer, more dependant relation-
ship with the US, or it could pursue a "long-term strategy to develop and 
strengthen the Canadian economy and ... reduce the present Canadian 
vulnerability". 28 The choice was obvious, and for the rest of the decade, 
Trudeau's government pursued its "Third Option," trying to reverse the 
process of integration that had been accelerating since the 1940s. "Con-
tractual links" with the European Community and Japan were soon in 
place but ultimately proved of little value as neither East nor West was 
much interested in buying what Canada wanted to sell. 
With the Third Option as backdrop, Trudeau's relations with Nixon's 
successors, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, proved remarkably good. 
27 Cited in ibidem, p. 106. 
28 Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-US Relations: Options for the Future". 
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Both president's continued Nixon's efforts to promote detente with the 
Soviet Union and both proved helpful to Ottawa in dealing with the 
separatist aspirations of Rene Lesvesque's Parti Quebecois, elected to 
office in November 1976. Of course, there were the usual number of 
bilateral irritants -some more irritating than others. Though deeply 
sceptical of nationalist ideology, Trudeau had to court the country's 
nationalists when he lost his parliamentary majority in the 1972 elec-
tion, a romance that continued late into the decade as the prime mi-
nister realized how useful pan-Canadian nationalism could be in buil-
ding national institutions to combat Quebec separatism. The Foreign 
Investment Review Agency (FIRA), whose impact was more symbolic 
than real, was created in 1972 to restrict foreign (read American) in-
vestment in Canada. Picking up where Pearson left off, Trudeau elimi-
nated the tax deduction enjoyed by Canadian businesses advertising 
in Time Magazine, finally forcing the publication's Canadian edition 
out of the country. The Canadian Radio and Television Commission 
(CRTC) adopted similar regulations for the broadcast industry in 1975, 
and later permitted Canadian cable companies to substitute local 
commercials for American advertising on the US programming that 
they rebroadcast. Congress roared but the Administration's response 
was resigned. "Well", Ford's national security advisor shrugged philo-
sophically, "there go the Canadians again".29 
The reaction to Trudeau's nationalistic energy policy was some-
what sharper. From the late 1940s, American capital had flowed into 
Western Canada, developing Alberta oil and gas for markets in the 
northern US, which depended on Canadian supply by the early 1970s. 
With the 1973 Middle East War and the decision by the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to reduce oil exports to 
the West, shortages loomed and energy prices spiked. Trudeau quick-
29 Cited in Hillmer and Granatstein, op. cit., p. 262. 
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ly moved to ensure that Canada had enough oil and gas for itself, decid-
ing to phase out Canadian oil and gas exports by 1980. He coupled the 
move with a steep and controversial export tax on oil and gas, whose 
proceeds effectively subsidized the price of energy in Canada. Wash-
ington was outraged. 
The bickering over energy, however, tended to wax and wane with 
the intensity of the international oil crisis. Moreover, Canada remained 
helpful on other, related fronts. It cooperated closely in Kissinger's 
schemes to create an International Energy Agency to offset OPEC, and 
Ottawa proved a sure-footed Western representative in the various 
North-South conferences that sprung up to address the yawning gap 
between rich and poor that the energy crisis had revealed so starkly. 
Indeed, by the fall of 1980, Trudeau's successful handling of bilateral 
energy issues emboldened his government to embark on an ambitious 
plan to reverse the historical pattern of foreign ownership of Canada's 
oil patch. The National Energy Programme (NEP), whose provisions 
permitted the retroactive expropriation of oil and gas concessions and 
reserved the resources for Canadian companies, smacked of a Third 
World statism that was alien to North American sensibilities. Carter's 
outgoing democratic administration reacted with puzzlement; Ronald 
Reagan's incoming republicans were not so charitable. 
Reagan, like most American presidents since the Second World War, 
was favourably disposed to his northern neighbour. Indeed, during his 
campaign he even talked of making relations with Mexico and Canada 
a priority. But his was also the most conservative and capitalist admin-
istration since the 1920s, and the NEP deeply offended official Washing-
ton. Though Trudeau shared Reagan's determination to respond force-
fully to renewed evidence of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, Africa, 
and Eastern Europe -Canada supported the stationing of Pershing mis-
siles in Europe and agreed to test the Cruise Missile- bilateral relations 
quickly ebbed to their lowest level since 1945. 
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For Trudeau, the timing could not have been worse. Between 1981 
and 1982, Canada slipped into recession: the GNP declined by $11 
billion, interest rates shot up, and unemployment soared. Protection-
ist pressures in Europe, Japan, and the US, already strong, were mount-
ing, and threatened to isolate Canada in a world divided into exclu-
sive trading blocs. Moreover the Third Option had clearly failed, with 
the US now accounting for almost 75.8 percent of exports, up from 
roughly 65 percent in the mid-1970s.30 Trudeau reversed course and 
instructed his officials to examine the one trade remedy that had ap-
parently worked in the past: sectorial free trade with the US. 
Preliminary talks were opened in 1983 but went nowhere. A joint re-
view of possible fields where free trade might benefit both countries 
revealed only four limited sectors. But the failure was also political. The 
National Energy Programme cast a deep pall over the prospects for bilat-
eral cooperation. So too did the gulf between Trudeau, the cool rationalist, 
and Reagan, the great (but perhaps simple-minded) communicator. Sadly, 
the Canadian made no secret of his contempt for the American president. 
When Reagan fumbled a reporter's question after a G7 meeting in 1982, 
Trudeau audibly whispered, 11Ask Al. He knows", a reference to the presi-
dent's more knowledgeable national security advisor, Al Haig.31 
Trudeau's successor, the Progressive Conservative Brian Mulroney, 
had a perspective on relations with the us that differed sharply from 
Trudeau's and Pearson's before him. Mulroney had grown up in a 
small lumber town, which gratefully acknowledged its lasting debt to 
the American investment that flowed into and opened up the remotest 
reaches of Canada in the 1950s. His adult years were spent at the 
30 Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian 
Foreign Policy, 1990, p. 331. 
31 Mark MacGuigan (edited by Whitney Lackenbauer), An Inside Look at External 
Affairs during the Trudeau Years: The Memoirs of Mark MacCuigan, 2002, p. 17. 
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helm of the Canadian subsidiary of an American multinational, the 
Iron Ore Company. Mulroney considered Canada as brash and as 
confident as he was, and thought it ought to embrace its good fortune 
as a North American nation. "Good relations, super relations with the 
us will be the cornerstone of our policy", he promised from the op-
position benches. 32 And he was as good as his word. Within days of 
his election as prime minister in September 1984, he assured New 
York investors that "Canada was open for business". 33 
Indeed, it was. NEP and FIRA were soon gone, replaced on the bilat-
eral agenda for the rest of the decade by Mulroney's search for free 
trade and guaranteed access to the American market. In March 1985, 
after a hokey song and dance routine at a Quebec City summit, Mul-
roney and Reagan agreed to preliminary discussions. It was time, 
Donald Macdonald, a former leading nationalist and chairman of a 
royal commission on Canada's economic prospects, announced, that 
Canadians shed their fear of the US and embraced free trade in "a 
leap of faith". Many Canadians agreed. By the winter of 1984-85, 
over two-thirds of the members of the Canadian Manufacturer's As-
sociation, a bastion of protectionist sentiment since 1911, supported 
free trade. Opposition to US investment was also down, dropping 
from 67 percent in 1981 to 50 percent in 1985.34 The idea of free trade 
was kicked around in public by a parliamentary committee during the 
summer of 1985 but provoked little opposition. Cabinet decided in 
late September to ask Washington to begin formal negotiations. 
The negotiations were long and arduous, stretching into the spring 
and summer of 1987. The fundamental Canadian objective was straight-
32 Cited in Bothwell, op. cit., p. 140 
33 Cited in Norman Hillmer and J.L. Granatstein, For Better or For Worse: Canada 
and the United States to the 1990s, 1991, p. 289. 
34 Cited in Bothwell, op. cit., p. 144. 
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forward: to secure and enhance access to the US market through an 
broad agreement exempting Canada from the full range of protectionist 
barriers perfected by generations of American legislators. American 
goals were narrower: an open market, a curb to government subsidies, 
and an end to controls on US investment in Canada. With much prod-
ding at the political level, a final agreement was reached in October 
1987. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) committed both countries to re-
move cross-border tariffs by 31 December 1998. Canada secured only 
a weak non-binding arbitration mechanism, while the US obtained 
non-discriminatory access to Canadian natural resources, including oil 
and gas. For some observers, the deal, consummated in a bitterly fought 
election in November 1988, seemed proof positive that Canada's his-
toric ambiguity towards the US had finally been swept aside. 
Was this then to be the last word, the final debate, on Canada's 
place in North America? Certainly, the 1990s suggested it was. As the 
Canadian economy surged ahead on the dot-com bubble, the FTA was 
transformed into NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) with 
barely a squeak of dissent, while the implications of closer bilateral 
trade were increasingly obscured behind the rhetoric of regional free 
trade, globalization, and Team Canada. Free trade, it appeared, had 
not harnessed Canada to North America so much as opened up the 
rest of the world to Canada. 35 
Canadians embraced this new world. Mulroney's government, with 
most of the country united behind it, was quick to support the US dur-
ing the First Gulf War, the apparent precursor to a new international 
order where right would triumph over might, and small powers might 
make a difference. Under Mulroney, and his Liberal successor, Jean 
Chretien, Canada's peacekeeping commitments mushroomed: Haiti, 
35 Andrew Cohen implicitly makes the same point in While Canada Slept: How We 
Lost our Place in the World, 2003, pp. 109-113. 
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Somalia, the Balkans. Canadians cheered as Chretien's long-serving for-
eign minister, Lloyd Axworthy, championed "soft power" and human 
security, becoming "Canada's best foreign minister since a guy named 
Lester Pearson". 36 The popular foreign minister campaigned to outlaw 
landmines, to establish an International Criminal Court and to revitalize 
the United Nations. American reaction was often sceptical and some-
times even hostile. Nonetheless, Canadians were delighted; surely this 
proved, once and for all, that Canada could enjoy the closest kind of 
economic partnership with Washington without surrendering its free-
dom to pursue a distinctively Canadian approach to world affairs. In a 
nutshell, it seemed, Canada could have its cake and eat it too. 
September 11 stripped bare this illusion. As border security tight-
ened and Canadian trucks lined up along side the highway, waiting to 
enter the us, a shudder of panic swept Ottawa. There was a new world 
order alright, but not the one Canadians had been anticipating. As 
President George Bush rolled out his war against terror -striking first 
Afghanistan and then Iraq-the shadow of imperial power flitted across 
Canada, prompting pundits and columnists to rush into print with rec-
ommendations on how Canada should respond, once and for all, to 
the American problem. Some, like Allan Gotlieb, a former ambassa-
dor to Washington and a deputy minister of foreign affairs under 
Trudeau, urged ever closer integration, a "grand bargain" that would 
trade guaranteed access to the American market for joint cooperation 
on North American perimeter security.37 Others, like Roy Maclaren, 
trade minister in Chretien's first ministry, mused about resurrecting a 
new "third option" and fleeing the tight North American embrace.38 
36 The Globe and Mail, 29 December 2000, cited in Greg Donaghy, "All God's Chil-
dren: Lloyd Axworthy, Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy, 1996-2000". 
37 See, for example, Allan Gotlieb, "A 'grand bargain' is exactly what we need". 
38 Roy Maclaren, "Wanted: EU trading partners. It's perilous for Canada to put all 
its eggs in one U.S. basket". 
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Norman Robertson would surely recognize and enjoy the debate, 
knowing that 60 years on, Canada was still unsure of its place in the 
new American empire. 
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